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DRIVING WHILE DISQUALIFIED OR 
SUSPENDED UNDER S 30 OF THE ROAD 
SAFETY ACT 1986 (VIC): ABOLITION OF 
THE MANDATORY SENTENCING 
PROVISION? 
BELINDA COLEMAN∗ 
[In an earlier article in 2001, Edney and Bagaric argued that the 
mandatory sentencing of persons to imprisonment pursuant to s 30 of the 
Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) for second or subsequent offences of Driving 
While Disqualified or Suspended cannot be justified and that reform is 
required. Since then the topic of mandatory sentencing for Driving While 
Disqualified or Suspended has assumed even greater importance having 
regard to (a) an increase in the number of administrative ways a person 
can now have their licence cancelled or disqualified; (b) the availability 
of recent empirical data demonstrating the number of persons sentenced 
to imprisonment for this offence; (c) the results of a major review of 
Victorian sentencing law and (d) an increase in the different ways a 
sentence of imprisonment can in fact (and in law) be served. In view of 
these developments, this article re-examines the use of mandatory 
sentencing for Driving While Disqualified or Suspended and argues that 
the arguments put forward by Edney and Bagaric are even more 
compelling five years down the track.] 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Victorian traffic law is a discrete and complex body of law governed by the Road 
Safety Act 1986 (Vic) and an overwhelming set of regulations. The law has grown 
over the decades to deal with new issues and problems associated with the use of 
motor vehicles. As the cars that are driven have become more complex and 
technologically advanced, so too has the law, arming law enforcement officers  
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with Freehills. This article is based on her thesis, submitted as part of the requirement for 
the degree of Bachelor of Laws (Hons) at La Trobe University, Bundoora. 
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with the tools needed to licence and control the motoring public. Speeding and 
drink driving have often been topics focused on by the legislature and Parliament 
has tended to introduce tough laws and penalties in an attempt to combat the ever 
increasing road toll. 
 
Driving While Disqualified or Suspended has been a motoring offence in Victoria 
for almost a century and carries one of the harshest penalties in the Road Safety 
Act 1986 (Vic). The offence itself is triable summarily and is contained within s 
30:  
 
(1) A person must not drive a motor vehicle on a highway while the 
authorisation granted to him or her to do so under this Part is suspended or 
during a period of disqualification from obtaining such an authorisation. 
Penalty: For a first offence, 30 penalty units or imprisonment for 4 
months; 
 For a subsequent offence, imprisonment of not less than 1 
month and not more than 2 years. 
(2) S 49 of the Sentencing Act 1991 does not apply with respect to proceedings 
for an offence against sub-section (1). 
 
The effect of the penalty section and sub-s 2 is that a person charged with a 
second or subsequent offence of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended must 
receive a sentence of imprisonment for at least one month. In effect, the 
sentencing provision carries a mandatory term of imprisonment for every person 
found guilty of a second or further breach of s 30. 
 
Driving While Disqualified or Suspended is the only offence in the Road Safety 
Act 1986 (Vic) to carry a mandatory term of imprisonment.1 It is a harsh and 
draconian provision that is structurally inappropriate, offends against the principle 
of proportionality and results in substantive and procedural unfairness.  
 
                                                 
1 The use of any form of mandatory sentencing has been widely criticised at the 
international and domestic level on the basis that removal of the judicial discretion in 
sentencing can lead to an unjust sentence. See, eg, Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Australia, UN Doc 
CERD/C/AUS/CO/14 (2005); Commonwealth, Human Rights (Mandatory Sentencing of 
Juvenile Offenders) Bill 1999, Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, 
Report 38/00, (2000); Commonwealth, Human Rights (Mandatory Sentencing for 
Property Offences) Bill 2000, Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, 
Report 33/02, (2002); Neil Morgan, ‘Going Overboard? Debates and Developments in 
Mandatory Sentencing, June 2000 to June 2002’ 26(5) Criminal Law Journal 293; Neil 
Morgan, ‘Mandatory Sentences in Australia: Where Have We Been and Where Are We 
Going?’ 24(3) Criminal Law Journal 164. 




Accordingly, one of the questions which this article has attempted to answer is 
why mandatory imprisonment has been used for this particular offence and 
whether its continued use can be justified. 
 
Advances in technology in law enforcement have resulted in expanding 
administrative sanctions that were never anticipated by the legislature at the time 
of the introduction of the mandatory sentencing provision. It will be argued that 
the justifications (to the extent that they can be identified) for the harsh sentence 
in s 30 can no longer be sustained. 
 
II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF S 30 OF THE ROAD SAFETY ACT 1986 (VIC) 
 
This section provides an overview of the major legislative reforms to the offence 
of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended provided for in s 30 of the Road 
Safety Act 1986 (Vic). A number of significant amendments have been made to 
the section over the years, and presumably, these have been made to reflect 
changes in social attitudes to car offences. However, a search of the relevant 
parliamentary debates and other literature has failed to reveal any clear basis or 
rationale for the changes in policy. It seems that the major alterations to s 30 have 
been introduced as a result of government reactions to official reports or 
recommendations. While there has been fierce debate over other traffic law 
amendments, there has been a distinct lack of discussion or discourse in the 
parliamentary chambers regarding s 30. This is surprising, given that s 30 is the 
only Victorian traffic offence to carry a mandatory term of imprisonment. 
 
 A Early History 
 
Legislation relating to conventional motor vehicles was first introduced in 
Victoria in the Motor Car Act 1910 (Vic). Prior to this, the only Victorian 
legislation dealing with motor vehicles was the Victorian Railways Motor Car Act 
1905 (Vic), which dealt with motor carriages or cars for passenger traffic. Section 
6 of the Motor Car Act 1910 (Vic) set out an offence of driving unlicensed: ‘no 
person shall drive a motor car upon any public highway without being licensed for 
that purpose’. Under s 8(3), suspended and disqualified licences had no effect, 
thereby rendering the holder legally unlicensed. No special penalty was provided 
for in either s 6 or s 8. However, under s 20, a person who acted in contravention 
of the Act was guilty of an offence and liable upon summary conviction to a 
penalty not exceeding ten pounds. In the case of a second or subsequent 
conviction, the person was liable to a penalty not exceeding 25 pounds or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months. Importantly, the discretion  
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was left to the court as to whether imprisonment should be imposed. The highest 
penalty listed in the 1910 Act was a penalty of 50 pounds.2 
 
The Motor Car Act 1915 (Vic) retained s 6 and s 8(3) but introduced an 
amendment to s 20. In the case of a second or subsequent conviction, the court 
was given the discretion to imprison with or without hard labour for a term of not 
more than three months as an alternate to the monetary penalty. 
 
The Motor Car Act 1928 (Vic) retained s 6 and s 8(3) and the penalty section was 
reproduced as s 25. 
 
In 1949 the specific and distinct offence of Driving While Disqualified or 
Suspended was inserted into the Motor Car Act 1928 (Vic).3 Section 9(1) stated:  
 
Any person who drives a motor car during the period of any suspension of his 
licence, or after his licence has been cancelled or during any period of 
disqualification for obtaining a licence shall be guilty of an offence. 
 
The specific offence of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended was inserted 
into the Act to assist police to detect and apprehend offenders who disobeyed 
court suspension or disqualification orders: 
 
Clause 8 is new. It provides a penalty of imprisonment for driving a motor car 
during a period of disqualification, or after cancellation or during suspension of a 
licence, and gives power to arrest without warrant for any such offence. The police 
advise us that, although a licence may be cancelled or suspended, they experience 
difficulty in dealing with individuals who keep on driving. Apart from legal 
difficulty in proving suspension, there is further difficulty in collecting the penalty 
imposed. The offence is a serious one and it is considered that, where a person 
wilfully disobeys the order of the court, power to arrest should be given and the 
penalty of imprisonment provided.4 
 
 
                                                 
2 This penalty was for contravening Motor Car Act 1910 (Vic) s14(1), eg, for failing to 
stop and render assistance, or for failing to give name and address or for failing to report 
to police after an accident (causing injury to a person, horse or vehicle) has occurred. As a 
comparison, a person in 1910 was liable to a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding three 
months or a fine not exceeding ten pounds for common assault (Crimes Act 1890 (Vic) 
s38), liable to imprisonment not exceeding 5 years for theft (Crimes Act 1890 (Vic) s66), 
liable to imprisonment not exceeding 15 years for burglary (Crimes Act 1890 (Vic) s121) 
and liable to suffer death as a felon for murder (Crimes Act 1890 (Vic) s3). 
3 The offence was inserted via the Motor Car (Amendment) Act 1949 (Vic). 
4 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 28 September 1949, 2391-92 
(Lieutenant Colonel Leggatt) (emphasis added). 




The section contained a penalty provision. For a first offence, the defendant was 
liable to be imprisoned for a maximum of one month and for second or 
subsequent offences, the defendant was liable to imprisonment for a minimum of 
one month and a maximum of three months. Although prima facie this seemed to 
be a mandatory sentencing provision, it is important to note that the court was able 
to fine an offender in lieu of imprisonment pursuant to the Justices Act 1915 (Vic) 
s 71, whether they were a first or subsequent offender.5 
 
The offence and penalty were reproduced without amendment in the Motor Car 
Act 1951 (Vic) s 27(1) and subsequently in the Motor Car Act 1958 (Vic) s 28(1). 
 
In 1961 a minor amendment was made pursuant to the Motor Car (Amendment) 
Act 1961 (Vic) s 8 to insert the words ‘to drive a motor car’ after the word 
‘licence’ to emphasise that the offence related to licences to drive motor cars. 
 
The penalty for a first offence of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended was 
increased in 1963 to a maximum of three months imprisonment for a first offence 
and a minimum of one month and maximum of six months imprisonment for 
subsequent offences.6 In his Second Reading Speech, the Minister indicated that 
there were ‘grave dangers involved in persons driving their cars after their licence 
has been suspended’ and indicated that increasing the penalty would deter drivers 
from making ‘a mockery of one of the most important safety provisions existing 
in our law.’7 Importantly, the discretion to fine first and subsequent offenders in 
lieu of imprisonment was still open to the court pursuant to the Justices Act 1958 
(Vic) s 74(1). 
 
 B The Introduction of the Mandatory Sentencing   
  Provision 
 
In 1967, s 28(3) was inserted into the Motor Car Act 1967 (Vic).8 This had the 
effect of removing the discretion to fine in lieu of imprisonment for either a first 
or subsequent breach of s 28. As a result, the term of imprisonment for an offence  
 
                                                 
5 The Justices Act 1915 (Vic) s71 states:  
Except where otherwise expressly enacted when a court of petty sessions has authority under this or 
under any other Act now or hereinafter in force to impose imprisonment for an offence punishable 
on summary conviction and has not authority to impose a penalty for that offence the court when 
adjudicating on such offence may notwithstanding if it thinks that the justice of the case will be 
better met by a penalty than by imprisonment impose a penalty of not more than Twenty-five 
pounds.  
6 Amendment via Motor Car Act 1963 (Vic) s9. 
7 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 1 May 1963, 3263 (Rylah). 
8 The section was inserted via Motor Car Act 1967 (Vic) s10. 
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of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended became mandatory. The amendment 
was introduced as a result of a recommendation made by the Road Toll 
Committee:  
 
In many instances, courts have imposed monetary penalties in lieu of terms of 
imprisonment by invoking the provisions of s 74 of the Justices Act 1958 which 
allows a court to impose a monetary penalty of not more than $200 if it thinks that 
the justice of the case will be better met by a penalty rather than by imprisonment. 
The committee is of the opinion, and the Government agrees, that a person charged 
with driving a motor vehicle during a period of suspension or disqualification or 
after cancellation of his licence should be in no doubt that, if convicted, he will not 
be given the opportunity of paying a fine.9 
 
The Road Toll Committee was convened to make recommendations on how the 
road toll could be reduced.10 The Committee was of the belief that the community 
‘expects the Courts to severely punish persons convicted of serious driving 
offences’ and that ‘if the details of penalties imposed for serious offences against 
road traffic laws were published in the daily press this would act as a deterrent to 
others’.11 These beliefs led to a recommendation that ‘Section 28(1) of the Act be 
amended to specifically exclude the operation of the provisions of S 74 of the 
Justices Act’.12 At the time the amendment was made, suspended sentences were 
not available (discussed further below) and this meant that the defendant actually 
served the term of imprisonment that was imposed by the court.13 This could be 
described as the high water mark of the history of mandatory imprisonment for the 
offence of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended. 
 
In 1978, major changes were made to the penalty for Driving While Disqualified 
or Suspended.14 Mandatory imprisonment for a first offence was removed and the 
court was given the discretion to impose either a penalty of not more than $1000  
 
                                                 
9 Rylah, above n 7, 714. 
10 Road Toll Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Report by Committee Convened to Make 
Recommendations on Means by which the Road Toll Could be Reduced (1967). 
11 Ibid 2-3. 
12 Ibid 17. 
13 Suspended sentences were available as a sentencing option pursuant to the Crimes Act 
1915 (Vic) s532 up until the introduction of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) when the section 
was abolished. A conditional suspended sentence was introduced via s 13 of the 
Alcoholics and Drug Dependant Persons Act 1968 (Vic) for offenders who satisfied the 
court that they ‘habitually used alcohol or drugs to excess’. The general suspended 
sentence was reintroduced in Victoria in 1986 via the Penalties and Sentences Act 1985 
(Vic) ss20-22 and was reproduced with amendment via the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s28. 
14 Changes were introduced via the Motor Car Act 1978 (Vic) s6. 




or imprisonment for a maximum of six months. For a second or subsequent 
offence, the penalty was changed to a minimum term of imprisonment of one 
month and not more than two years. At the time of the Second Reading Speech, 
the Minister distributed an Explanatory Paper which was not included in Hansard 
and it is not clear why the changes to the penalty were made.15 It is reasonable to 
assume that the amendments were made due to protests regarding the severity of 
the previous sentencing provision. 
 
In 1980 the scope of the offence was widened to include holders of suspended or 
disqualified motor vehicle learner’s permits and motorcycle learner’s permits.16 
No change to the penalty was made. 
 
In 1982, the penalty for a first offence was reduced to ‘not more than 20 penalty 
units or imprisonment for not more than four months’.17  This amendment was 
introduced after a review was conducted of the penalties in the Motor Car Act 
1958 (Vic). In his Second Reading Speech the Minister stated: 
 
The review examined every offence in the Act and determined fresh penalties, 
largely independently of the historical bases which were originally established, to 
reflect the relative severity of the offences as perceived in the present day, to ensure 
that the amount of the monetary penalty is commensurate with the costs of 
prosecution, to relate the penalties for certain offences to the penalties prescribed 
for similar types of legislation …and to relate the imprisonment penalties…to the 
monetary penalties to achieve uniformity.18 
 
In 1986 the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) was introduced to replace the Motor Car 
Act 1958 (Vic). The old Motor Car Act had been amended by ‘some 120 
subsequent Acts’, was supplemented by approximately 250 pages of regulations  
 
                                                 
15 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 March 1977, 6113 (Wilkes). 
A search of the relevant debates did not indicate where a copy of the explanatory paper 
could be located. Further inquiries with the State library and Parliamentary library did not 
assist. 
16 Amended by Motor Car (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1980 (Vic) s8. 
17 Amended by Motor Car (Penalties) Act 1982 (Vic) s19. 
18 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 21 October 1982, 1368 
(Matthews). It is interesting that here the Minister is referring to the ‘relative’ severity of 
penalty by placing the specific penalty for Driving While Disqualified or Suspended 
within the broader sentencing context. A similar type of ‘relativist’ exercise was 
conducted in Victoria by the Victorian Sentencing Committee in 1988 which led to the 
restructuring of sentences for all crimes listed in the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). See Richard 
Fox and Arie Freiberg, Sentencing Task Force Review of Statutory Maximum Penalties in 
Victoria: Report to the Attorney-General, (1989). 
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and had never been consolidated.19  The new Act was a major consolidation of 
Victorian road traffic law. Whilst it re-enacted the legislation, it was designed to 
be in a form which the average motorist could understand.20  
 
The offence of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended was retained under s 
30(1):  
 
A person must not drive a motor vehicle on a highway while the authorisation [eg, 
driver’s licence] granted to him or her to do so under this part is suspended or 
during a period of disqualification from obtaining such an authorisation. 
 
The penalty for a first offence was increased to 30 penalty units or imprisonment 
for a maximum of four months. The justification for the increase was to eliminate 
anti-social behaviour, thereby ensuring ‘safe, efficient and equitable road use’.21 
Interestingly, in an article discussing s 30, Bagaric and Edney have suggested that 
increasing penalty levels does not actually result in a reduction in crime.22 
Increasing sentences/sanctions and the deterrent effect on target conduct is 
problematic and is discussed below. The penalty of a minimum of one month and 
a maximum of two years imprisonment for a subsequent offence did not change, 
and under s 30(2) the court was prevented from fining an offender in lieu of 
imprisonment:23 
 
Section 49 of the Sentencing Act 1991 does not apply with respect to proceedings 
for an offence against sub-s (1). 
 
 C Recent Legislative Changes 
 
The most recent amendment to the offence of Driving While Disqualified or 




                                                 
19 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 11 September 1986, 227 
(Roper). 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid 228. 
22 Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, ‘Imprisonment For Driving while Disqualified: 
Disproportionate Punishment or Sound Public Policy?’ (2001) 25(1) Criminal Law 
Journal 7, 16. 
23  Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s49(1) states that if a person is found guilty of an offence the 
court may, subject to any specific provision relating to the offence, fine the offender in 
addition to or instead of any other sentence to which the offender may be liable. 
24 The section was inserted by Transport Legislation (Amendment) Act 2004 (Vic). 




(1) This section applies if a person is found not guilty of an offence against 
section 30 on the grounds that he or she was not aware at the relevant time – 
(a) that his or her authorisation had been suspended; or 
(b) that he or she was disqualified from obtaining an authorisation. 
(2) The court hearing the matter may order that the person serve a period of 
suspension or disqualification that is in substitution for any of the period of 
suspension or disqualification that applied to the person at the relevant time 
during which the person was not aware of the suspension or disqualification. 
(3) The maximum period that the court may impose under sub-section (2) is a 
period equal to the period between – 
(a) when the person’s authorisation was suspended, or when the period of 
disqualification started; and 
(b) when the person was made aware of the suspension or disqualification, 
or the period of suspension or disqualification ended, whichever is the 
earlier. 
(4) For the purposes of appeal or review, any period of suspension or 
disqualification imposed under sub-section (2) is to be treated as if it had 
been imposed for the same reason that the original period of suspension or 
disqualification was imposed.  
 
This amendment gives the court the power to order that a defendant who has been 
successful in defending a charge of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended on 
the basis of an ‘honest and reasonable belief’,25 serve a period of suspension or 
disqualification that is in substitution for the original period of suspension or 
disqualification. As a result, the ‘successful’ defendant can no longer be said to be 
completely victorious. This amendment is important because it recognises the 
defence of ‘honest and reasonable belief’ but also ensures that the defendant 
serves out the original suspension or disqualification period. 
 
It would be reasonable to hypothesise that this section has been inserted as a result 
of recognition by the government that drivers may be unaware that their licence 
has been interfered with. However, an examination of the relevant extrinsic 
material fails to support this contention. One would assume that such a significant 
amendment would have resulted in at least some discussion in Parliament. 
Surprisingly, in the Second Reading Speech and subsequent debates, no mention 




                                                 
25 In order to successfully defend a charge of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended on 
the basis of ‘an honest and reasonable belief’, the defendant must prove, on the balance of 
probabilities, that he or she believed, and had reasonable grounds for believing, that he or 
she was licensed to drive at the time of the alleged offence: Kidd v Reeves [1972] VR 563, 
567. 
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makes a number of other minor and technical amendments to the provisions of the 
Road Safety Act dealing with alcohol interlocks, admissibility of evidence 
regarding demerit points, driving while suspended or disqualified, and parking 
infringement notices.’26 
  
 D Comparison with other Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic)  
  Provisions 
 
It is arguable that the mandatory sentencing provision in s 30 is the harshest 
sentence provided for in the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic). For example: 
 
(i) A person found guilty of Driving in a Dangerous Manner under s 64 of 
the Act is liable on a first or subsequent offence to a fine not exceeding 
240 penalty units or to imprisonment for not more than two years or 
both.27 The court is not prevented from fining an offender in lieu of 
imprisonment under s 49(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) and the 
court has the discretion to consider sentencing options other than 
imprisonment.28 
 
(ii) A person found guilty of a drink driving or drug driving offence under 
any of s 49(1)(b) - (g) of the Act is liable on a first offence to a fine of not 
more than 12 penalty units;29 and in the case of a subsequent offence, to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than 3 months.30 Again, the court is 
not prevented from fining an offender in lieu of imprisonment under s 
49(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) and can consider alternative 
sentencing options for second and subsequent offenders.31 
 
(iii) A person found guilty of Driving under the Influence of Intoxicating 
Liquor or any Drug under s 49(1)(a) of the Act is liable on a first offence 
to a fine of not more than 25 penalty units or to imprisonment for a term 
of not more than three months;32 and in the case of a subsequent  
 
 
                                                 
26 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18 November 2004, 1736 
(Batchelor) (emphasis added). 
27 Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s64(2). 
28 Richard Fox and Arie Freiberg, Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (2nd ed, 
1999) 653-654. 
29 Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 49(3)(a). 
30 Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s49(3)(b). 
31 Fox and Freiberg, above n 28, 653-654. 
32 Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s49(2)(a). 




 offence, to imprisonment for a term of not more than 12 
months.33However, unlike s 30(2), the court is not prevented from fining 
an offender in lieu of imprisonment34 and given that there is no minimum 
term of imprisonment set, the court has the discretion to consider 
sentencing options other than imprisonment.35 
 
(iv) A person found guilty of Leaving the Scene of an Accident, Failing to 
Report or Failing to Supply his or her Name and Address where a Person 
has been Killed or Seriously Injured under s 61(1) of the Act is liable for a 
first offence to a fine of not more than 20 penalty units or to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than four months; and in the case of 
a subsequent offence, to a fine of not more than 40 penalty units or to 
imprisonment for a term of not less than four months and more than 12 
months. 36 The court is not prevented from fining an offender in lieu of 
imprisonment under s 49(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). 
 
(v) A person found guilty of Unlicensed Driving under s 18 of the Act is 
liable on a first or subsequent offence to a penalty not exceeding 25 
penalty units or to imprisonment for not more than three months.37 
 
 E Comparative State and Territory Provisions 
 
Every State and Territory in Australia legislates against Driving While 
Disqualified or Suspended.38 At first glance it seems that Western Australia, South 
Australia and the Northern Territory are the only other jurisdictions to carry 
mandatory imprisonment terms for Driving While Disqualified or Suspended.39 




                                                 
33 Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s49(2)(b). 
34 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s49(1) states that if a person is found guilty of an offence the 
court may, subject to any specific provision relating to the offence, fine the offender in 
addition to or instead of any other sentence to which the offender may be liable. 
35 Fox and Freiberg, above n 28, 653-654. 
36 Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s61(4)(a). 
37  Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s18(1)(c). 
38 A summary of all relevant comparative provisions is provided in Appendix A. 
39 In the Northern Territory only drivers that are disqualified are subject to a ‘mandatory’ 
term of imprisonment; judicial officers are given the discretion in the sentencing provision 
to either fine or imprison suspended drivers: see Traffic Act 2004 (NT) ss31-32; Road 
Traffic Act 1974 (WA) s49; Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) s 91(5). 
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imprisonment.40 Examining the Western Australian, South Australian and 
Northern Territory provisions, it seems that they are even more severe than 
Victoria’s provision, as all of these jurisdictions specify a term of imprisonment 
for first offenders.41 However, none of these provisions specify a minimum period 
of imprisonment and the court has a discretion to fix an alternative penalty.42 In all 
three States, where a term of imprisonment is imposed, it may be suspended (See 
below for more discussion about ‘suspended sentences’).43 In reality, the only 
State to mandate imprisonment for ‘Driving While Disqualified or Suspended’ is 
Victoria. 
 
It is important to note that the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, Western 
Australia and Tasmania allow a person that has been either suspended or 
disqualified from driving a motor vehicle to apply to the court for a ‘restricted’ or 
‘extraordinary’ driver’s licence.44 If granted, the restricted or extraordinary licence 
allows the person to continue driving in certain circumstances. For example, a 
tradesperson may be granted a restricted licence allowing him or her to drive a 
motor vehicle for the purposes of carrying on his or her trade between the hours of 
7am and 6pm on weekdays. The legislation allows the court to impose any 
restrictions that it considers necessary in the circumstances.45 At present, restricted 
or extraordinary licences are not available in Victoria. 
 
III DISQUALIFICATION/SUSPENSION MECHANISMS 
 
There are many mechanisms which give the courts and other authorities the ability 
to interfere with a driver’s licence. These include legislative provisions which a 
subscribe a mandatory period of licence disqualification or suspension and 
legislative provisions which give authorising officers and courts a discretion to  
 
                                                 
40 Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1998 (NSW) s25A; Road Transport (Driver 
Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) s32; Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 
(Qld) s78; Vehicle & Traffic Act 1999 (Tas) s 9. 
41 Traffic Act 2004 (NT) ss31-33; Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) s91(5). 
42 Fox and Freiberg, above n 28, 54-55. See also Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s9. 
43 Sentencing Act 2005 (NT) s 40; Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) ss 39 and 42; Police v Cadd 
(1997) 69 SASR 150. In South Australia, the court also has the power to suspend the 
sentence on the condition that the defendant enters into a bond: See Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s38. 
44 Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Regulations 2000 (ACT) rules 45-51; Transport 
Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) s87(1); Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) 
s76(3); Vehicle & Traffic Act 1999 (Tas) s18. 
45 Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Regulations 2000 (ACT) rule 48(4); Transport 
Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) s87(4); Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) 
s76(5); Vehicle & Traffic Act 1999 (Tas) ss18(1) and (5). 




interfere with licences.46 A mandatory statutory suspension or disqualification 
provision demands strict compliance: the judicial officer or administrative body is 
given no other option but to interfere with the offender’s licence.47  
 
 A Mandatory Administrative Suspension or   
  Disqualification 
 
 1 Traffic Infringement Notices 
 
Under the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) a member of the police force, an authorised 
municipal council staff member, an authorised employee of the Department of 
Infrastructure, or an authorised officer of the Roads Corporation may issue traffic 
infringement notices to drivers for a range of prescribed offences.48 In addition, a 
presiding officer of the Legislative Council or the Legislative Assembly may issue 
an infringement notice where the offence occurs on the Parliamentary reserve,49 a 
Protective Services Officer appointed under Part VIA of the Police Regulation Act 
1958 (Vic) may issue a notice where the offence occurs on specific areas of 
land,50 and an authorised officer of a public authority may issue an infringement 
notice where the offence occurs on land or premises under the control of the 
public authority.51  
 
In some circumstances the issuing officer must suspend a driver’s licence or 
disqualify a person from obtaining a licence or permit. Whether the licence is 




                                                 
46 A suspended licence is a licence that has no effect during the period of suspension but 
automatically resumes validity at the end of the suspension period: See Road Safety Act 
1986 (Vic) s28A. The suspended driver is treated as disqualified from driving during the 
period of suspension, however, once the suspension period is over, the person may resume 
driving without having to make an application to the court or the Roads Corporation. A 
disqualified driver is usually a driver who has had his/her licence or permit cancelled and 
who is prohibited from applying for any licence or permit during the period of 
disqualification: See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s28B; Road Safety (Drivers) Regulations 
1999 (Vic) reg 201. Once the period of disqualification has expired, the driver is 
unlicensed and must apply to the court or to the Roads Corporation to have his/her licence 
renewed: for example, see Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) ss50(3)-(6). 
47 Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (Nygh & Butt ed, 1999) 282. 
48 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) ss77(2) & 88(1). 
49 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s77(2)(da). 
50 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 77(2)(ab)(i)-(ii).  
51 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s77(2)(e).  
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(i) Where a traffic infringement notice has been issued under s 89C of the 
Act for drink driving (under s 49 of the Act) the offending driver’s licence 
will be disqualified for a minimum period of six months.52 
 
(ii) Where a traffic infringement notice has been issued under s 89D of the 
Act for excessive speeding under Rule 20 of the Road Rules 1999 (Vic), 
the offending driver’s licence will be suspended for a minimum of one 
month.53 
 
2 Demerit Points 
 
The Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) makes provision for a Demerit Points Register 
and the Roads Corporation is responsible for recording demerit points incurred by 
drivers.54 There are numerous traffic offences that incur demerit points.55 Once a 
person has incurred a prescribed number of demerit points, the Roads Corporation 
must serve a notice informing the person that they have exceeded the prescribed 
limit.56 Where a person does not elect to extend their demerit point period, the 
Roads Corporation must suspend the licence or permit for a prescribed period.57 
Where a person elects to extend their demerit point period but subsequently incurs 
additional points, the Roads Corporation must suspend a licence or permit for a 
prescribed period.58 
 
In addition, the Roads Corporation must suspend or cancel a person’s licence or 
permit if the person has been disqualified from driving in another jurisdiction or 
the person’s licence has been cancelled due to a judgment, order or decision made 
under the law of that jurisdiction.59  
                                                 
52 Schedule 1 of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) lists the minimum disqualification periods 
for drink driving offences. 
53 Schedule 5 of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) lists the minimum suspension periods for 
excessive speed. 
54 Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s25. 
55 See Column 1 of Table 1 of the Road Safety (Drivers) Regulations 1999 (Vic). 
56 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s25(3). See Road Safety (Drivers) Regulations 1999 
(Vic) reg 302 for the prescribed particulars of a notice. The prescribed number of demerit 
points for a full licence holder is 12 or more points in a 3-year period: Road Safety Act 
1986 (Vic) s25(3)(a). The prescribed number of demerit points for a learner permit or 
probationary licence holder is 5 or more points in one year or 12 or more points in any 3 
year period: Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s25(3)(b).  
57 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s25(3D). 
58 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s25(3B). 
59 Road Safety (Drivers) Regulations 1999 (Vic) reg 303(2). It is not known what factors 
will be taken into account by the Corporation in determining whether to suspend or 
disqualify under this section as nothing is specified in the Act or Regulations.  




3 Mandatory Suspension or Disqualification by a Court 
 
The court must either suspend a driver’s licence or disqualify a person from 
obtaining a licence or permit in circumstances where a serious offence involving a 
motor vehicle has occurred. Whether the licence is suspended or disqualified and 
the length of the suspension or disqualification will be determined by the relevant 
statutory provision. Mandatory suspension or disqualification periods are attached 
to numerous offences.60 
 
In addition to the mandatory provisions discussed above, the following legislation 
gives authorising officers and courts a discretion whether to interfere with drivers’ 
licences by way of either suspension or disqualification in certain circumstances. 
 
 4 Discretionary Administrative Suspension or    
  Disqualification  
 
S 51 Notices: Under s 51(1) of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) a member of the 
police force or an authorised Roads Corporation officer may issue a notice of 
suspension to certain persons charged with an offence under sections 49(1)(b), (c), 
(d), (f) or (g).61 The notice has the effect of immediately suspending the licence of 
the defendant until the charge has been determined. 
Although on its face the provision is discretionary, police policy states that where 




                                                 
60 A list of these offences is provided in Appendix B. There were once a large number of 
offences relating to probationary drivers for which mandatory suspension was imposed by 
a court. However, Road Safety (Drivers) Regulations 1999 (Vic) rule 218 & Schedule 1 
were repealed in December 2003 by Road Safety (Drivers) (Demerit Points) Regulations 
2003 (Vic) rules 5 & 7 and demerit points are now administratively recorded for these 
offences. 
61 A notice can only be issued to persons in the following categories: charged with an 
offence where the blood or breath analysis is 0.15 or more for a full licence holder, 
charged with an offence where the blood or breath analysis is 0.07 or more for a 
probationary or learner driver, charged with refusing to undergo a preliminary breath test, 
charged with refusing or failing to stop at a preliminary breath testing station, charged 
with refusing to undergo a blood analysis test, charged with refusing to supply a blood 
sample, charged with driving under the influence of a drug, charged with refusing to 
undergo or comply with a drug impairment assessment, charged with refusing to give a 
blood or urine sample after undergoing a drug impairment assessment or where the person 
has been previously found guilty or convicted of an offence involving alcohol. See further 
Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) ss51(a), (b), (c), 51(1A) and 51(1B).  
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‘unless [the] particular circumstances warrant otherwise.’62 Where the licence is 
not suspended, the officer must prepare a report for superior officers justifying the 
reasons for not applying s 51.63 
 
S 24 Notices: Under s 24 of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic), the Roads 
Corporation has the power to suspend, in a broad range of circumstances, a 
driver’s licence or permit for any time it thinks fit.64  
 
 5 Discretionary Suspension or Disqualification by a Court  
 
Under s 28(1) of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) any Victorian court has a general 
discretionary power to suspend or cancel a licence or permit: 
 
If a court convicts a person of, or is satisfied that a person is guilty of, an offence 
against this Act or of any other offence in connection with the driving of a motor 
vehicle, the court – 
(b) …may suspend for such time as it thinks fit or cancel all driver licences and 
permits held by that person and, whether or not that person holds a driver licence, 
disqualify him or her from obtaining one for such time (if any) as the court thinks 
fit. 
 
This section allows a court to suspend a driver’s licence or permit or disqualify a 
person from obtaining a licence or permit where that person is found guilty of any 
summary or indictable offence where the driving of a motor vehicle is 
‘substantially tied to the offence in question’.65  
                                                 
62 Victoria Police Learning Resource Development Unit, Victoria Police Reference Guide 
(2005) 275. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Circumstances include where a person has failed or refused to submit to a test to 
determine fitness to drive under s 27 of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic); where it would be 
dangerous for the person to drive because of illness, bodily infirmity, defect or incapacity; 
where the person does not have sufficient knowledge of road law or driving ability; where 
the person is not suitable to hold a licence or permit; where the person has not paid a fine, 
penalty costs or restitution ordered by a court; where the person is no longer eligible for a 
licence or permit; where a licence or permit was issued in error; where a cheque submitted 
to the Corporation as payment for a fee has been dishonoured; where the person has been 
convicted in another State, Territory or country of an offence which would have 
suspended or cancelled the person’s licence or permit had they been licensed to drive in 
that State, Territory or country; where the person has failed to comply with a condition of 
their licence or permit; and where the person has surrendered their licence or permit to the 
Roads Corporation or other licensing authority for cancellation. See Safety (Drivers) 
Regulations 1999 (Vic) reg 303(1). 
65 Fox and Freiberg, above n 28, 534; see for example Murdoch v Simmonds [1971] VR 
887 where an assault by kicking by one driver of another was held to be insufficiently 




In addition, even where a court has not recorded a conviction,66 the court is given 
a discretionary power to suspend a driver’s licence or permit in a number of 
circumstances.67  
 
 6 The Defendant’s Awareness of the Licence Interference 
 
Due to the processes by which licences may be suspended or disqualified, it is 
entirely possible that a person appearing in court for a second offence of Driving 
While Disqualified or Suspended may not have been to court previously for that 
offence. 
 
 7 The Process of Administrative Suspension or   
  Disqualification 
 
A traffic infringement notice, s 51 notice or a Roads Corporation notice issued 
under the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) may be served by delivering the notice 
personally, by leaving it at the usual or last known place of residence or business 
of the person, by sending it by post addressed to the person at the usual or last 
known place of residence or business or by sending the notice to any other address 
that has been registered at the Roads Corporation.68 The consequence of this is 
that a driver incurring a suspension or disqualification by way of a traffic 
infringement or Roads Corporation notice may not receive the notice at all and 
may continue to drive due to lack of awareness. 
 
 8 Suspension or Disqualification via Court Process 
 
It is also possible for a driver’s licence to be suspended or disqualified by a court 
in the absence of the defendant. Most of the traffic offences discussed above are 






                                                                                                                          
connected to the driving of the vehicle and Rochow v Pupavac [1989] VR 73 where the 
defendant’s driver’s licence was suspended because he drove his car to the scene of the 
theft. 
66 See Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss7 & 8 for information regarding conviction and non-
conviction. 
67 See Appendix C. 
68 Road Safety (General) Procedures Regulations 1999 (Vic) reg 602; Road Safety Act 
1986 (Vic) s93 (emphasis added). 
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of Victoria.69  A Charge and Summons document may be issued by a member of 
the police force70 and may be served by either: 71 
 
• Delivering a copy to the defendant personally, or 
• By leaving a copy at the defendant’s last or most usual place of residence or 
business, or 
• By post addressed to the person at their last known place of residence or 
business. 
 
The police informant issuing and serving the charge has the option of serving on 
the defendant a brief of evidence setting out all of the evidence that the police will 
utilise to prove the charge.72 A brief of evidence is served in the same manner as a 
charge and summons.73 This is significant because where a defendant does not 
appear in court to answer a charge and the court is satisfied that the charge and 
brief of evidence have been served in the prescribed manner, the evidence 
contained in the brief will be admissible and the court may determine the charge 
and sentence the defendant in his or her absence.74 This is commonly known as an 
ex parte hearing. The Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) also sets out a procedure 
whereby the court may determine a charge by accepting sworn oral evidence from 
the police informant in the defendant’s absence.75 This is also known as an ex 
parte hearing. A driver who fails to attend court to answer a summons may thus 
have had his or her licence disqualified or suspended ex parte and may continue to 
drive due to lack of awareness. Even in circumstances where the driver knew that 
he or she had lost their licence, it is extremely likely that the driver was not aware 
of the penalty for a breach of s 30 (discussed further below).76 
 
If the defendant is convicted of a suspending or disqualifying offence pursuant to 




                                                 
69 The County and Supreme Courts may determine a summary offence where it is part of a 
package of more serious offences: Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s359AA; R Fox, Victorian 
Criminal Procedure (2005) 83.  
70 Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) s30. 
71 Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) ss34 & 36. 
72 Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) s37. 
73 Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) s37. 
74 Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) s41. 
75 Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) Sch 2, cl 5(3). 
76 B Watson, The Psychological Characteristics and On-road Behaviour of Unlicensed 
Drivers, (PhD Philosophy Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2004) 160. 




heard.77 The defendant will be automatically entitled to a re-hearing where the 
charge sheet was served by post and the court is satisfied that the defendant was 
not aware of the charge prior to the hearing.78 
 
Where the defendant does attend court to answer the charge, he or she will have 
the choice of entering a plea of guilty or not guilty.79 In both situations, where the 
charge is proven the defendant will usually be present in court to hear the sentence 
imposed. In these circumstances it will extremely difficult for a defendant to 
prove at a subsequent hearing that he or she was not aware that their licence was 
suspended or disqualified. 
 
IV THE SENTENCE 
 
As outlined previously, the penalty for a second or subsequent offence of Driving 
While Disqualified or Suspended is a mandatory term of imprisonment for not 
less than one month and not more than two years.80 However, this does not 
necessarily mean that the defendant will automatically be incarcerated. The order 
made by the court must be a ‘custodial order’, that is, a direction ‘that the offender 
be held in the custody of the State’.81 ‘Custody’ in this sense is different from 
incarceration or confinement, in that the order of the court will define ‘the period 
during which the State may intervene in the individual’s daily life’ within 
society.82 The Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) provides for a number of alternative 
custodial orders, allowing for different degrees of physical restraint and control 












                                                 
77 Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) s93. 
78 Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) s95. 
79 Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) s51; Sch 2, cl 2. 
80 Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s30(1). 
81 Fox and Freiberg, above n 28, 637.  
82 Ibid 638. 
83 Ibid 637. 
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 A Alternative Sentencing Options 84 
 
Presumably, there will be cases where an actual term of imprisonment is 
appropriate and proportionate, for example, where a person has been found guilty 
of breaching s 30 on multiple occasions and is clearly a recalcitrant and recidivist 
offender. However, immediate imprisonment is not appropriate for the majority of 
s 30 offenders. In Victoria, an adult defendant sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment for Driving While Disqualified or Suspended may serve that term in 
one of the following ways. 
 
 1 Immediate term of imprisonment 
 
An immediate term of imprisonment involves the actual confinement of the 
offender in a State facility for a fixed term.85 According to Fox and Freiberg, 
immediate imprisonment is a ‘little used sanction in Victoria’ and accounts for 
only 5 per cent of sentences in the Magistrates’ Court.86 The number of Victorian 
offenders in fact imprisoned for traffic offences is slight. A statistical profile of 
the Victorian Prison System published in 2002 revealed that the number of 
offenders actually imprisoned for licence and registration offences relating to 
motor vehicles dropped from 4.3% of the total prison population to 1.7% of the 
population over a seven year period.87 The percentage of persons imprisoned 
specifically for breaches of s 30 of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) is likely to be 
lower than this figure because the published statistics do not discern between the 
varying licence and registration offences.88 It is however significant to note that in 
some States more people are imprisoned for Driving While Disqualified or 




                                                 
84 In addition to the sentencing options outlined above, two pilot programs are currently 
underway in Victoria that may be applicable to s 30 offenders: Drug Treatment Orders and 
Home Detention Orders. No statistical data dealing with these pilot programs and their 
relationship with s 30 offenders is available at this time. Research has been unable to 
reveal whether any drug treatment or home detention orders have been handed down to s 
30 offenders. The legislation dealing with these orders is complex and will not be 
discussed further: see Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss7, 5(4A) & 5(4B). 
85 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss7(a), 9-18P. 
86 Fox and Freiberg, above n 28, 644. 
87 Office of the Correctional Services Minister, Statistical Profile: The Victorian Prison 
System 1995-96 to 2000-2001, (2001) 28.  
88 The statistical profile does not specifically list the number of persons imprisoned for s 
30 breaches. 
89 Bagaric and Edney, above n 22, 8. 




In most cases the power to imprison is discretionary, and even where the statute 
creates an offence punishable by imprisonment, s 49(1) of the Sentencing Act 
1991 (Vic) allows the judicial officer to substitute a fine for imprisonment.90 
However, this option is not available for the offence of Driving While 
Disqualified or Suspended due to the provision in s 30(2) of the Road Safety Act 
1986 (Vic). Judicial officers who are loath to immediately imprison a person 
found guilty of a second or subsequent offence of Driving While Disqualified or 
Suspended must give affect to the imprisonment provision stated in the Act. 
Hence, the judicial officer will often choose one of the other options below. 
 
 2 Combined Custody and Treatment Order 
 
A court that is considering imposing a sentence of imprisonment of not more than 
12 months may make a Combined Custody and Treatment Order (CCTO) if it is 
satisfied that there is a causal link between the offender’s drunkenness or drug 
addiction and the commission of the offence.91 The order cannot be made without 
the judicial officer having received a drug and alcohol assessment report.92 Where 
such an order is made, the defendant serves six months in custody, and the 
balance of the sentence is served within the community under close supervision 
while undergoing treatment for alcohol or drugs.93 If at any time during the 
operation of the order, the offender commits another offence punishable by 
imprisonment, the court must order the offender to serve in custody the whole part 
of the order that was to be served in the community unless exceptional 
circumstances exist.94 In addition, the order may be confirmed or the offender may 
be returned to custody if he or she fails to comply with any of the conditions of 







                                                 
90 Fox and Freiberg, above n 28, 646. S 49(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) states ‘if a 
person is found guilty of an offence the court may, subject to any specific provision 
relating to the offence, fine the offender in addition to or instead of any other sentence to 
which the offender may be liable.’ 
91 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s18Q(1); Fox & Freiberg, above n 28, 673. 
92 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s18Q(1)(c). 
93 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss18Q(1), 18R. 
94 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 18W(1), 18W(5) & 18W(6). 
95 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s18W(5). 
96 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s18W(1). 
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Combined custody and treatment orders were specifically introduced to assist in 
sentencing offenders who suffer from alcohol or drug addiction.97 Such orders are 
treated as more severe than Intensive Corrections Orders (see below) and judicial 
officers are precluded from imposing a CCTO unless the relevant purposes of the 
punishment cannot be achieved by an Intensive Corrections Order or a Drug 
Treatment Order (see below).98  
 
No statistical data on the number of combined custody and treatment orders 
handed down to s 30 offenders is available at this time 
 
 3 Intensive Correction Order 
 
An Intensive Correction Order (ICO) allows an offender to discharge a sentence 
of imprisonment of up to 12 months wholly by service in the community under 
close supervision while engaging in unpaid community work and other 
rehabilitative programs.99 It is effectively a prison sentence served in the 
community.100 If at any time during the operation of the order, the offender 
commits another offence punishable by imprisonment, the court must cancel the 
order and commit the offender to prison for the unexpired portion unless 
exceptional circumstances exist.101 The order may be varied, confirmed or 
cancelled if the offender fails to comply with any of the terms of the order.102 A 
breach of an ICO is a separate offence under the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic).103 
According to Richards, the ICO ‘is the highest level sanction available that still 
avoids the disruptive effects of immediate imprisonment on the offender and his 
or her family’.104 
 
No statistical data on the number of intensive correction orders handed down to s 
30 offenders is available at this time, however, it is likely that this penalty is less 
popular than a suspended sentence, given that the conditions of an intensive  
 
                                                 
97 Fox and Freiberg, above n 28, 671-673. 
98 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss7, 5(4A) and 5(4B). In a recent sentencing review 
conducted for the Victorian government, Freiberg recommended that CCTO’s be 
abolished: see also Arie Freiberg, Pathways to Justice: Sentencing Review, (2002) 5-6. 
99 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss19-26. 
100 Sentencing Advisory Council, Suspended Sentences Discussion Paper, 15 (2005). 
101 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss26(1), 26(3A) & 26(3B). 
102 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss26(1) & 26(3A). 
103 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s26(1). 
104 D Richards, The Intensive Correction Order in University of Melbourne and Leo 
Cussen Institute Seminar, The Sentencing Act 1991, Melbourne (1991) 4.3 quoted in Fox 
and Freiberg, above n 28, 567. 




correction order are often onerous. The ICO is considered to be a harsher penalty 
than a suspended sentence (see below) due to its position above the suspended 
sentence in the hierarchical listing of sentencing options found in s 7 of the 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic).105 
 
 4 Suspended Sentence of Imprisonment 
 
A suspended sentence is a sentence of imprisonment imposed on a person that is 
not activated.106 Under s 27 of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), a judicial officer 
may impose a sentence of imprisonment and then order that the sentence be 
suspended in whole for a specified period (eg, the offender does not serve any 
time in gaol) or in part (eg, the offender serves part of the sentence in gaol and is 
then released - the rest of the gaol term is held in suspense for a specified 
period).107 The maximum period that the sentence may be suspended for in the 
Magistrates’ Court is two years.108 If at any time during the period of suspension, 
the offender commits another offence punishable by imprisonment, the court must 
restore the sentence and order the offender to serve it unless exceptional 
circumstances exist.109 A breach of a suspended sentence order is a separate 
offence under the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic).110  
 
The courts have insisted that the suspended sentence must be regarded as a 
sentence of imprisonment, and is a very significant punishment rather than a soft 
option.111 In Elliot v Harris (No 2)112 Bray CJ remarked: 
 
 [F]ar from being no punishment at all, a suspended sentence is a sentence of 
imprisonment with all the consequences such a sentence involves on the 
defendant’s record…and it is one which can be called…into effect on the slightest 
breach of [its] terms…during its currency. A liability…to serve an automatic term 
of imprisonment as a consequence of any proved misbehaviour in the legal sense, 
no matter how slight, can hardly be described as no punishment. 
 
                                                 
105 Fox and Freiberg, above n 28, 567. In a recent sentencing review conducted for the 
Victorian government, Freiberg recommended that changes be made to ICO’s: see also 
Freiberg, above n 100, 12-15. 
106 Sentencing Advisory Council, above n 98, 13. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s27(2). 
109 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s31(1), 31(5) & 31(5A); Kent v Wilson [2000] VSC 98; R v 
Stevens [1999] VSCA 173; R v McLachlan [1999] 2 VR 665; R v Tran [2000] VSCA 95. 
110 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s31(1). 
111 R v McConkey (No 2) [2004] VSCA 26 per Eames JA; DPP v David [2003] VSCA 
202; DPP v Buhagiar & Heathcote [1998] 4 VR 540; R v Whitnall (1993) 42 FCR 512. 
112 (1976) 13 SASR 516, 527. 
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The overwhelming majority of second and subsequent offenders who drive while 
disqualified or suspended receive suspended terms of imprisonment and it has 
been suggested that this as a direct result of the mandatory imprisonment 
requirement in s 30.113 In the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria in 2003-2004, the 
most common offences for which a suspended sentence was imposed was for 
Driving While Disqualified (14 per cent) and Driving While Suspended (11 per 
cent): a total of 25 per cent of all orders imposing suspended sentences.114 The 
next highest category of offence for which a suspended sentence was handed 
down was for ‘Shopstealing’ (9.6 per cent).115  
 
Table 1: Number of Suspended Sentences for Breach of S 30 of the Road 
Safety Act 1986 (Vic)116 





1 July 1999 - 
30 June 2000 
228 109 337 
1 July 2000 - 
30 June 2001 
184 128 312 
1 July 2001 – 
30 June 2002 
220 146 366 
1 July 2002 – 
30 June 2003 
341 199 540 
1 July 2003 – 
30 June 2004 
474 355 829 
 
Suspended sentences for Driving While Disqualified or Suspended have continued 
to rise since 2001. In the financial year ending 30 June 2001, 184 suspended 
sentences were imposed upon defendants for Driving While Disqualified and 128 
suspended sentences were imposed for Driving While Suspended. These figures 
rose in the financial year ending 30 June 2002 to 220 and 146 respectively, then 
rose again in the financial year ending 30 June 2003 to 341 and 199. The figures 
rose dramatically in the following year to 474 for Driving While Disqualified and 
355 for Driving While Suspended. The rise in suspended sentences for breaches of 
s 30 corresponds with a rise in the number of citizens found guilty of breaches of s 
30117 (these figures are discussed below).  
 
                                                 
113 Sentencing Advisory Council, above n 100, 85. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid 86, 168. 
116 Ibid 172. 
117 Figures obtained from Court Services, Victorian Department of Justice by the author 
via Freedom of Information on 15 August 2005. 




Bagaric and Edney have suggested that by imposing suspended sentences for 
breaches of s 30 of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic), the courts are remaining 
formally but not substantively true to the edict of Parliament.118 According to Fox 
and Freiberg, the guidelines in the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) make it clear that 
suspended sentences are preferred over other custodial orders.119 
 
 5 Further Interference with the Offender’s Driver’s Licence 
 
As already outlined above, any Victorian court has a general discretionary power 
to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence under s 28(2) of the Road Safety Act 1986 
(Vic) where that person is found guilty of any summary or indictable offence 
where the driving of a motor vehicle is ‘substantially tied to the offence in 
question’.120 In addition to the actual custodial order, this section gives the court 
discretion to further suspend a driver’s licence or disqualify a person from 
obtaining a licence or permit where they have committed an offence of Driving 
While Disqualified or Suspended. Therefore a person in breach of s 30 could 
receive a term of imprisonment coupled with a further loss of licence. 
 
V ABOLISH THE MANDATORY SENTENCING PROVISION? 
 
The words of King CJ in Yardley v Betts (1979) 22 SASR 108 are particularly 
relevant with respect to the imprisonment of offenders for breaches of s 30: 
 
a term of imprisonment may turn a usefully employed person into a frustrated 
unemployed person, may deprive the offender of the best and most stabilising 
influences of his life by disrupting a good family situation, and may increase a 
propensity to crime by placing him in the company of criminals.121 
 
A second or subsequent breach of s 30 is simply a summary traffic offence, yet 
the provision carries the harshest penalty that the State has the capacity to inflict. 
As Bagaric and Edney point out, it is possible for people convicted of serious 
offences such as manslaughter, armed robbery or aggravated burglary to escape 
imprisonment, yet a second or subsequent offender driving on the road  
 
                                                 
118 Bagaric and Edney, above n 22, 11. 
119 Fox and Freiberg, above n 28, 682. See Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 5(4),7(a),7(ab), 
7(b) and 7(c). 
120 Fox and Freiberg, above n 28, 534; see, eg, Murdoch v Simmonds [1971] VR 887 
where an assault by kicking by one driver of another was held to be insufficiently 
connected to the driving of the vehicle and Rochow v Pupavac [1989] VR 73 where the 
defendant’s driver’s licence was suspended because he drove his car to the scene of the 
theft. 
121 Yardley v Betts (1979) 22 SASR 108, 113. 
DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 11 NO 2 48 
 
while suspended or disqualified must be sentenced to imprisonment.122 Is there 
any justification for retaining such a harsh sentencing provision? It is strongly 
argued that if there ever was any justification for the mandatory sentencing 
provision, there is no longer any valid reason for imprisoning citizens for Driving 
While Disqualified or Suspended. 
 
 VI ARGUMENTS FOR REFORM OF S 30 OF THE ROAD   
  SAFETY ACT 1986 (VIC) 
 
 A  Violation of Proportionality Principle 
 
The underlying principle of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) is the principle of 
proportionality, that is, judicial officers should impose a sentence that is 
proportionate or appropriate to the offence.123 In the famous High Court decision 
of Veen v R (No 2), the majority stated: 
 
The principle of proportionality is now firmly established in this country. It was the 
unanimous view of the court in Veen (No 1) that a sentence should not be increased 
beyond what is proportionate to the crime in order merely to extend the period of 
protection of society from the risk of recidivism on the part of the offender.124 
 
It has been argued that the decision of Veen (No 2) went as far as pronouncing the 
principle of proportionality as the primary aim in sentencing in Australia.125  
 
The mandatory sentencing provision in s 30 violates the proportionality principle 
because the punishment far outweighs the objective seriousness of the offence.126 
According to Bagaric and Edney, the direct consequences of Driving While 
Disqualified or Suspended causes no harm to others and ‘does not relate to any 
issue of public safety’,127 yet judicial officers are precluded from taking into 
account the particular mitigating personal circumstances of each individual case, 
other than to determine the length of imprisonment to be imposed. Sentencers are 
forced to apply a harsh and unrelenting sentencing provision to a number of  
 
 
                                                 
122 Bagaric and Edney, above n 22, 7. 
123 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s5(3); Freiberg, above n 96, 37. 
124 Veen v R (No 2) (1988) 77 ALR 385, 390 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey 
JJ. 
125 Bagaric and Edney, above n 22, 9. 
126 Ibid. However, this does not mean that imprisonment will never be appropriate. There 
may be rare circumstances in which a judicial officer in his or her discretion may decide to 
impose imprisonment for a breach of s 30. 
127 Ibid 10. 




different offending circumstances, the result being that ‘unequal offenders’ could 
receive the same sentence.128  
 
Mandatory sentencing has been described as ‘facially neutral’ in that it allows ‘for 
no differentiation or prejudice according to race, sex or age’.129 In practice, 
however, the mandatory sentence in s 30 can impact disproportionately on those 
that use their motor vehicle often, particularly in the course of their work. 
Ordinary citizens that require the use of their vehicle in order to maintain 
employment face a choice between driving in breach of s 30 and loss of income 
for the duration of the suspension or disqualification period and perhaps 
beyond.130 
 
The mandatory sentencing provision in s 30 does not allow judicial officers to 
make allowances for the particular circumstances associated with the breach in 
question, and it is argued that ‘just sentencing requires an assessment of the 
special circumstances of each case that only a judge is in a position to make.’131 
 
 B  Lack of Clear Basis or Rationale Underlying the  
  Provision 
 
Earlier it was shown that there has not been any clear basis or rationale for the 
changes made over the years to the sentencing provision in s 30. The legislature 
has tended to make broad statements about ‘contempt’, ‘danger’ and ‘deterrence’. 
It is likely that the changes made to the provision have been made in response to 
community pressure and expectations. 
 
1 Contempt of Court 
 
In 1949, the legislature introduced the specific offence of Driving While 




                                                 
128 D Roche, ‘Mandatory Sentencing’ (1999) 138 Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal 
Justice: Australian Institute of Criminology, 5. 
129 Morgan, above n 1, 182. Morgan was arguing this point in the context of the WA and 
Northern Territory mandatory sentencing provisions which unfairly discriminate against 
young male aboriginal offenders. 
130 According to Watson’s study, drivers that offend against s 30 do not represent a 
‘homogeneous group’ and there is ‘a range of differences…between…offenders in terms 
of their psychosocial characteristics.’ Watson, above n 76, 222. 
131 Roche, above n 128, 4-5. 
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wilfully disobeyed an order of the court.132 This rationale may have been justified 
at that time, as the only manner in which a driver could have his or her licence 
interfered with was by order of a court. As has been shown in earlier, there are a 
number of administrative processes that are now available to either suspend or 
disqualify a driver, either with or without his or her knowledge. ‘Contempt of 
court’ can no longer be relied upon as a legitimate reason for the mandatory 
sentencing provision in s 30, given the variety of ways in which the defendant 
may have his or her licence interfered with. 
 
2 Grave Danger 
 
The rationale for the increase in penalty to the provision in 1963 was that there 
were ‘grave dangers involved in persons driving their cars after their licence has 
been suspended’.133 However, Driving While Disqualified or Suspended per se 
causes no harm or threat to other road users or members of the public, and the 
course of conduct that makes up the offence is simply the act of driving on a 




The legislature in 1963 indicated that by increasing the penalty for s 30 it would 
‘deter drivers’.135 Later, in 1967 the legislature relied upon a Road Toll 
Committee report that was of the belief that publishing the details of serious 
penalties imposed for s 30 breaches in the daily press would also bring about 
general deterrence.136 In 1986, the justification for the increase in penalty was to 
eliminate anti-social behaviour.137 
 
In reality, the harsh sentencing provision has not deterred people from continuing 
to offend against s 30. As the table below shows, breaches of s 30 are continuing 





                                                 
132 Victoria (Parliamentary Debates) Legislative Assembly, 28 September 1949, 2391-92 
(Lieutenant Colonel Leggatt). 
133 Victoria (Parliamentary Debates) Legislative Assembly, 1 May 1963 (Rylah) 3263. 
134 Bagaric and Edney, above n 22, 18. 
135 Victoria (Parliamentary Debates) Legislative Assembly, 1 May 1963 (Rylah) 3263. 
136 Chief Secretary’s Department, above n 10, 2-3. 
137 Victoria (Parliamentary Debates) Legislative Assembly, 11 September 1986, 228 
(Roper). 




Table 2: Number of Persons Found Guilty for Breach of S 30 of the Road 
Safety Act 1986 (Vic)138 





1 July 1999 - 
30 June 2000 
3087 2192 5279 
1 July 2000 – 
30 June 2001 
2858 2207 5065 
1 July 2001 – 
30 June 2002 
2912 2092 5004 
1 July 2002 – 
30 June 2003 
4235 2661 6896 
1 July 2003 – 
30 June 2004 
5172 4145 9317 
 
In the financial year ending 30 June 2001, the number of people found guilty of 
Driving While Disqualified fell 7 per cent to 2858 from 3087 the year prior. The 
figure increased slightly the following year by 2 per cent to 2912. In the financial 
year ending 30 June 2003, the figure increased dramatically by 45 per cent to 
4235, then increased again in the following year by 22 per cent to 5172.  
The number of people found guilty of Driving While Suspended in the 
Magistrates’ Court in the financial year ending 30 June 2001 increased by 1 per 
cent to 2207 from 2192 the year prior. The figure decreased slightly the following 
year by 5 per cent to 2092. In the financial year ending 30 June 2003, the figure 
increased dramatically by 27 per cent to 2661, then increased again the following 
year by 56 per cent to 4145. 
 
According to Davies and Raymond, statistical evidence, other evidence and logic 
shows that ‘contrary to popular belief encouraged by media and politicians, that 
the prospect of a gaol sentence if caught and convicted…is not an effective 
general deterrent, or for the most part an effective specific deterrent.’139 
 
A study by Watson in 2004 showed that current penalties for unlicensed driving 
(including penalties for Driving While Disqualified or Suspended) ‘appear to have 
a minimal deterrent impact on offenders.’140 His study showed that people who are 
unlicensed (including those who have had their licence suspended or disqualified)  
 
                                                 
138 Figures obtained from Court Services, Victorian Department of Justice by the author 
via Freedom of Information on 15 August 2005. 
139 G Davies and K Raymond, ‘Do Current Sentencing Practices Work?’ (2000) 24(4) The 
Criminal Law Journal 236, 241. 
140 Watson, above n 75, 232. 
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tend to continue to drive after detection, particularly for work purposes.141 A prior 
conviction for Unlicensed Driving or Driving While Disqualified or Suspended 
did not appear to have any significant impact on either subsequent offending or a 
future intention to offend.142 More importantly, his study showed that only 14 per 
cent of the participants in the study knew what the penalties for Unlicensed 
Driving or Driving While Disqualified or Suspended were prior to being 
detected.143  
 
Both Watson’s findings and the statistics above indicate that the deterrent function 
of the sentencing provision in s 30 is questionable. Citizens are unlikely to be 
deterred generally, given that most people are ignorant about the penalties for 
Driving While Disqualified or Suspended; and Watson’s study shows that even 
where people are convicted of a breach of s 30 and become aware of the 
consequences of a second breach, they continue to drive while suspended or 
disqualified. Bagaric and Edney are correct in stating that ‘it is simply time for the 
legislature to devise a more effective sanction’.144 
 
4 The Rise of Administrative Sanctions 
 
It is reasonable to assume that the current range of administrative licence 
sanctions was never envisaged by the legislature when the mandatory provision 
was first introduced. 
 
No longer does the motoring offender need to attend court to have an order made 
against his or her licence. Administrative sanctions such as traffic infringement 
notices, demerit points, s 51 notices and s 24 notices may affect a person’s 
licence, whether or not that person has knowledge of the administrative process. 
For example, there are currently approximately 101 traffic related infringement 
notices that may result in licence cancellation, licence suspension or demerit 
points for the person deemed to be the driver.145 
 
The rise in administrative mechanisms by which a person may have their licence 
suspended correlates with the recent substantial rise in people being found guilty  
 
                                                 
141 Ibid 214. Watson’s study confirms results obtained from a questionnaire by Smith and 
Maisey in Western Australia in 1990: see Smith and Maisey, Survey of Driving by 
Disqualified and Suspended Drivers in Western Australia (1990).  
142 Watson, above n 76, 233. 
143 Ibid 160. 
144 Bagaric and Edney, above n 22, 18. 
145 Victoria Police Traffic Support Division’s Legal & Agency Liaison Unit, Infringement 
Notice Offences, Penalties & Codes (2005). 




of Driving While Suspended. For example, in the year ending 30 June 2004, the 
number of people found guilty of Driving While Suspended rose by 56 per cent 
from the previous year. It is reasonable to assume that as the use of administrative 
sanctions increases, so does the amount of people found guilty of breaches of s 
30.146 
 
There is no doubt that the growing reliance on administrative processes to detect 
and punish motoring offenders presents problems for the criminal justice system 
in terms of due process and procedural fairness.  
 
 5  Lack of Procedural Fairness 
 
Due to administrative processes and court ex parte procedures, it is possible for a 
person to be convicted or found guilty of Driving While Disqualified or 
Suspended without ever having attended court. Recent amendments made to s 30 
via s 30A of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) tend to acknowledge that the 
legislature is aware that people may be driving without knowing that they are 
breaching s 30. The question arises as to whether it is fair to continue to allow a 
sentencing provision that obliges sentencers to impose a custodial order against a 
defendant even when that person had no real knowledge that such a sentence 
would be imposed. 
 
Fair procedure is essential in the criminal justice process.147 It is ‘relevant to 
preserving the cooperation and goodwill of the public in law enforcement 
matters.’148 According to American studies, crucial elements of procedural 
fairness include neutrality of the decision-maker, polite treatment of the defendant 
and respect for the defendant’s rights.149 An opportunity for the defendant to state 
his or her case is also important.150 
 
Fox has highlighted that administrative sanctions such as the infringement notice 
system do ‘not allow for the individualisation of treatment, the calling of criminal 
records, or differential penalties.’151 He argues that: 
 
                                                 
146 It is conceded that some other factors such as an increase in the population, an increase 
in proactive policing or an increase in police numbers. More research is required. 
147 R v Barton (1980) 147 CLR 75; Jago v District Court of NSW (1989) 168 CLR 23; R v 
Dietrich (1992) 177 CLR 292. 
148 Richard Fox, ‘Criminal Justice on the Spot: Infringement Penalties in Victoria’ (1995) 
233 Australian Institute of Criminology. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid 238. 
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[Administrative sanctions] carry the risk that they will produce an inappropriate 
escalation of penalties without procedural protections normally regarded as 
essential and which, in aggregate, may produce levels of punishment which are far 
more onerous than a proportionate response would warrant.152 
 
The Victorian infringement notice system is unfair in that it relies in part on 
vicarious liability: the owner of the motor vehicle is responsible for rebutting the 
presumption that he or she was the driver at the time of the alleged offence.153 The 
system essentially holds people accountable for conduct for which they may have 
no moral culpability. According to Fox, few people elect to go to a Magistrates’ 
Court for a hearing on liability and/ or penalty, even though infringement notices 
carry harsh sanctions such as demerit points, suspension and disqualification.154 
The administrative system may result in the person accumulating demerit points 
that they are not responsible for, and may ultimately lead to the suspension of 
their licence. Procedural unfairness is heightened by the fact that a demerit points 
suspension notice under s 25 of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) that is sent to the 
last known address registered with the Roads Corporation is prima facie taken to 
be served on the person.155  
 
Even where a defendant has been personally detected by police, the defendant 
may not be aware that he or she has received a penalty notice, a notice of 
suspension under s 51 or has been summoned to attend court, due to the fact that 
notices and summonses may be posted to the person’s last known place of 
business or residence.156 
 
Some may argue that administrative procedural unfairness is eliminated by the 
process of re-hearings.157 However, it is argued that where imprisonment is the 
ultimate sanction, procedural fairness should be built into related administrative 
enforcement processes, to ensure that the system is fair and just. Sentencing a 
defendant to a custodial sentence in circumstances where that person was not 
sufficiently aware of the consequences of Driving While Disqualified or 
Suspended is abhorrently unfair. 
 
                                                 
152 Ibid 191. 
153 Ibid 193. 
154 Richard Fox, ‘Criminal Sanctions at the Other End’ (Paper presented at the 3rd National 
Outlook Symposium on Crime in Australia, Canberra, 22-23 March 1999) 4. 
155 Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s25(4A). 
156 Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s93; Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) ss35 & 36. 
157 Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) s95. 




VII SOLVING THE PROBLEM 
 
In a recent sentencing review conducted for the Victorian government, Freiberg 
indicated that the law relating to s 30 of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) would 
need to be reviewed if other proposed changes to the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) 
were adopted.158 What then are the possible alternatives? 
 
 A Return the Discretion to the Judicial Officer 
 
Bagaric and Edney argue that no person should be imprisoned for a breach of s 
30.159 However, one could envisage circumstances where it may be appropriate to 
sentence a recidivist s 30 offender to a custodial term. The most appropriate 
alternative to a mandatory term of imprisonment is to return discretion to the 
judicial officer. This could be done in either of two ways: 
 
(i) Erase the minimum term of imprisonment set out in s 30(1) of the Road 
Safety Act 1986 (Vic) and erase s 30(2) of the Road Safety Act 1986 
(Vic), thereby allowing the court to fine a defendant in lieu of 
imprisonment; or 
 
(ii) Substitute the current penalty provision for an ‘and/or’ provision, for 
example, ‘a fine not exceeding 30 penalty units or imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding 4 months’. 
 
 B ‘Last Resort’ Reform 
 
Given that the legislature has been extremely eager to imprison offenders for 
breaches of s 30 over the last nine decades, it is unlikely that the provision will be 
amended to return the discretion to judicial officers. Some thought has therefore 
been given to other alternatives. It is important to note that the author regards the 
following suggestions as ‘last resort’ options.  
 
The following alternatives may return some legitimacy to the mandatory 
sentencing provision in s 30: 
 
 
                                                 
158 Freiberg, above n 97, 217. The proposed change that directly affects s 30 is the 
recommendation that the Intensive Corrections Order should cease to be a term of 
imprisonment. If the nature of the ICO is changed in this way it will not be available as a 
sentencing option under s 30. Freiberg made a total of 50 recommendations in the 
sentencing review: Ibid 4-21. 
159 Bagaric and Edney, above n 22, 11. 
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 1 Restricted Licences 
 
One possible alternative is to introduce into Victorian traffic law ‘restricted’ or 
‘extraordinary’ driver’s licences.160 If modelled on the other State and Territory 
provisions, such licences would need to be applied for via the court and granted 
by a judicial officer. The court would be able to impose any conditions on the 
licence considered necessary in the circumstances. When granting an application, 
the judicial officer would be obliged to inform the applicant of the consequences 
of driving outside the conditions of the licence. Driving outside the conditions of 
the licence would attract a charge under s 30 and all of the consequences attached 
to such a breach. The holder of a restricted or extraordinary licence would be 
precluded from later arguing that he or she was unaware of the consequences of 
driving outside the terms of the licence. In essence, the ‘contempt of court’ 
justification for the mandatory sentencing provision would return to s 30. 
 
2 Reform the Procedure for Licence Interference 
 
Another way to return justification to the mandatory sentencing provision in s 30 
would be to dramatically change the administrative procedures for suspending or 
disqualifying drivers’ licences. Administrators could be precluded from 
interfering with drivers’ licences, and instead would need to apply to the court for 
an order that the person’s licence be suspended or disqualified. Such an order 
would not be able to be granted in the absence of the defendant, and the judicial 
officer would be obliged to inform the defendant of the consequences of 
breaching the order, in a similar manner to the restricted or extraordinary licence 
procedure outlined above.  Some legitimacy would return to the mandatory 
sentencing provision in s 30, as the defendant would be informed by the court of 
the consequences of driving while disqualified or suspended. 
It is however unlikely that the legislature would remove the right of administrators 
to interfere with drivers’ licences, given the growth in the infringement notice 






                                                 
160 See, eg, Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Regulations 2000 (ACT) rules 45-51; 
Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) s87(1); Road Traffic Act 
1974 (WA) s76(3); Vehicle & Traffic Act 1999 (Tas) s18. 
161 Fox, above n 154, 2. 




 3 Abolish ex parte hearings on s 30 
 
A final alternative would be to abolish ex parte hearings on s 30, thereby giving 
the court the ability to explain to the defendant the seriousness of further 
offending. However, this alternative would not be of much assistance if the 
administrative ways of interfering with licences remained in place. It is also 
unlikely that the courts would be able to cope with the increase in hearings that 




This article has attempted to discover why mandatory imprisonment has been used 
for s 30 and whether its continued use can be justified. An examination of the 
Parliamentary Debates and other extrinsic material has not revealed any clear 
rationale for the introduction of mandatory sentencing, although it is assumed that 
Parliament considered specific deterrence, general deterrence and retribution to be 
important. Research has shown that there are now numerous administrative 
mechanisms for licence interference which would not have been envisaged by the 
legislature in 1967 when the provision was introduced. Statistics have revealed 
that there has been a dramatic increase in the amount of people found guilty of 
breaching s 30 over the preceding few years and it is quite possible that this 
increase is due to the growth in the use of administrative mechanisms for licence 
interference. The author does acknowledge that there may be other factors to 
explain the increase: further research is required to ascertain the cause for the rise 
in offending and to find alternative ways in which offending could be reduced. 
Research has also shown that it is possible to offend against s 30 without 
knowledge of the breach, giving rise to procedural fairness issues. Knowledge of 
the actual penalties for Driving While Disqualified or Suspended amongst 
motorists is also lacking. 
 
In summary, the continued use of the mandatory sentencing provision in s 30 
cannot be justified because: 
 
• The provision violates the principle of proportionality contained in the 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic); 
• The harsh sentencing regime has not deterred motorists from offending 
against s 30; 
• The rise in administrative ways of licence interference was never envisaged 
by the legislature when the provision was first introduced and gives rise to 
procedural fairness issues; 
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• A comparison with other offences contained in the Road Safety Act 1986 
(Vic) has revealed that the offence in s 30 is less serious but contains one of 
the harshest penalties. The mandatory sentencing provision is therefore 
structurally inappropriate. 
 
It is strongly argued that the sentencing provision in s 30 should be abolished and 
the discretion to imprison should be returned to judicial officers. This view is 
supported by a recent Victorian sentencing review conducted by Freiberg for the 
State Government: 
 
[T]he Review reaffirms a commitment to the common law principle of 
proportionality which it believes provides the appropriate foundation upon 
which sentencing should be built. This means, in effect, that sentences 
should be neither excessively severe nor excessively lenient. It does not 
mean, however, that each offence should carry with it a prescribed or pre-
determined level of punishment. For that reason it rejects mandatory or 
minimum penalties’.162 
 
It is strongly argued that the government should adopt the reasoning of Freiberg 
and abolish the mandatory sentencing provision in s 30. 
                                                 
162 Freiberg, above n 98, 33-34 (emphasis added). 
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APPENDIX B: OFFENCES FOR WHICH 
MANDATORY SUSPENSION OR 
DISQUALIFICATION ATTACHES 
 
I OFFENCES INVOLVING INJURY OR DANGEROUS DRIVING 
 
• Found guilty or convicted of manslaughter arising from driving a motor 
vehicle under common law;163 
• Found guilty or convicted of negligently causing serious injury arising out of 
the driving of a motor vehicle under the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 24;164  
• Found guilty or convicted of culpable driving causing death under the Crimes 
Act 1958 (Vic) s 318;165  
• Found guilty or convicted of dangerous driving causing death under the 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 319;166 
• Found guilty or convicted of dangerous driving causing serious injury under 
the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 319;167 
• Convicted of driving in a dangerous manner under the Road Safety Act 1986 
(Vic) s 64(2); 
• Found guilty or convicted of driving at a speed of 130 kph or more under the 
Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 28(1)(a); 
• Found guilty or convicted of driving 25 kph or more over the speed limit 
under the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 28(1)(a). 
 
II ALCOHOL AND DRUG OFFENCES 
 
• Found guilty or convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs 
under the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 49(1)(a);168  
• Found guilty or convicted of refusing to undergo a preliminary breath test 
under the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 49(1)(c);169  
• Found guilty or convicted of refusing or failing to stop at a preliminary breath 
testing station under the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 49(1)(d);170  
                                                 
163 See Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s89(1). 
164 See Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s89(1). 
165 See Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s89(1). 
166 See Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s89(1). 
167 See Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s89(1). 
168 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s50(1B).  
169 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s50(1B). 
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• Found guilty or convicted of refusing to undergo a breath analysis test under 
the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 49(1)(e);171 
• Found guilty or convicted of refusing to supply a blood sample for analysis 
under the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 49(1)(e);172 
• Found guilty or convicted of driving or being in charge of a motor vehicle 
while having a blood alcohol level above the prescribed limit (not less than 
0.07 grams for a first offence or not less than 0.05 grams for a subsequent 
offence) under the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 49(1)(b);173  
• Found guilty or convicted of furnishing a sample of breath showing a blood 
alcohol concentration above the prescribed limit (not less than 0.07 grams for 
a first offence or not less than 0.05 grams for a subsequent offence) within 
three hours of driving or being in charge of a motor vehicle under the Road 
Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 49(1)(f);174  
• Found guilty or convicted of driving or being in charge of a motor vehicle and 
furnishing a sample of blood showing a blood alcohol concentration above the 
prescribed limit (not less than 0.07 grams for a first offence or not less than 
0.05 grams for a subsequent offence) within three hours under the Road Safety 
Act 1986 (Vic) s 49(1)(g);175  
• Found guilty or convicted of refusing to undergo or comply with a drug 
impairment assessment under the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 49(1)(ca);176  
• Found guilty or convicted of refusing to give a blood or urine sample after 
undergoing a drug impairment assessment under the Road Safety Act 1986 




• Convicted of failing to supply information to police to ascertain the actual 
driver of a motor vehicle under the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 60(2); 
• Convicted of failing to stop after an accident where a person is killed or 
seriously injured under the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 61(6); 
• Convicted of failing to render assistance after an accident where a person is 
killed or seriously injured under the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 61(6); 
 
                                                                                                                          
170 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s50(1B). 
171 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s50(1B). 
172 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s50(1B). 
173 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) ss50(1), 50(1A) & 50(1AB). 
174 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) ss50(1), 50(1A) & 50(1AB). 
175 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) ss50(1), 50(1A) & 50(1AB). 
176 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s50(1D). 
177 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s50(1D). 





• Convicted of failing to provide name, address and registration number of 
motor vehicle after an accident where a person is killed or seriously injured 
under the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 61(6); 
• Convicted of failing to report accident to police where a person is killed or 
seriously injured under the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 61(6). 
 
IV OTHER OFFENCES 
 
• Convicted of theft or attempted theft of a motor car under the Crimes Act 
1958 (Vic) s 74.178 
                                                 
178 See Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s89A(4). 
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APPENDIX C: DISCRETIONARY POWER TO 
SUSPEND A LICENCE OR PERMIT 
 
The court is given a discretionary power to suspend a driver’s licence or permit in 
the following circumstances: 
 
• Where a person is found guilty of theft or attempted theft of a motor car under 
s 74 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic);179 
• Where a person is found guilty of driving or being in charge of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood alcohol level above the prescribed limit (where 
the reading is less than 0.05 grams on a first offence and the person is a 
probationary or taxi driver) under s 49(1)(b) of the Road Safety Act 1986 
(Vic);180  
• Where a person is found guilty of furnishing a sample of breath showing a 
blood alcohol concentration above the prescribed limit (where the reading is 
less than 0.07grams on a first offence and the person is a probationary or taxi 
driver) within three hours of driving or being in charge of a motor vehicle 
under s 49(1)(f) of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic);181  
• Where a person is found guilty of driving or being in charge of a motor 
vehicle and furnished a sample of blood showing a blood alcohol 
concentration above the prescribed limit within three hours (where the reading 
is less than 0.07grams on a first offence or the person is subject to a zero 
blood or breath alcohol condition and the reading is less than 0.05 grams)182 
under s 49(1)(g) of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic);183  
• Where a person is found guilty of driving or being in charge of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood alcohol level above the prescribed limit (where 
the reading is less than 0.07grams on a first offence or the person is subject to 
a zero blood or breath alcohol condition and the reading is less than 0.05 
grams)184 under s 49(1)(b) of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic);185  
• Where a person is found guilty of furnishing a sample of breath showing a 
blood alcohol concentration above the prescribed limit within three hours of  
 
                                                 
179   See Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s89A(4). 
180   See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) ss50(1), 50(1A) & 50(1AB).  
181   See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) ss50(1), 50(1A) & 50(1AB). 
182   See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s52.   
183   See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) ss50(1), 50(1A) & 50(1AB). 
184   See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s52.  
185   See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) ss50(1), 50(1A) & 50(1AB).  




 driving or being in charge of a motor vehicle (where the reading is less than 
0.07grams on a first offence or the person is subject to a zero blood or breath 
alcohol condition and the reading is less than 0.05 grams)186 under s 49(1)(f) 
of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic);187  
• Where a person is found guilty of driving or being in charge of a motor 
vehicle and furnished a sample of blood showing a blood alcohol 
concentration above the prescribed limit (less than 0.07 grams for a first 
offence or less than 0.05 grams for a subsequent offence) within three hours 
under s 49(1)(g) of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic).188 
 
                                                 
186 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s52.  
187 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) ss50(1), 50(1A) & 50(1AB). 
188 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) ss50(1), 50(1A) & 50(1AB). 
